Category: Science Policy

James Webb, Vannevar Bush, and Basic Research in Space

On By Danny RobbIn History, History of Exploration, History of Science, Science Policy, Space ExplorationLeave a comment

In November 1962, NASA administrator James Webb wrote a letter to President John F. Kennedy after a contentious meeting about the Apollo program. In that meeting, they had litigated the overall goal of the US space program, and arrived at a sort of agreement in principle. They both wanted the United States to achieve “preeminence in space.” What exactly that meant, however, was still up in the air. But there was one aspect of “preeminence” that Webb was quite convinced of, and he reiterated it in his followup letter to the President:

“To be preeminent in space,” he wrote, “we must conduct scientific investigations on a broad front.”1

He told the president that while the US led the Soviet Union in some areas of science (geophysics, solar physics, interplanetary), there were other areas where the US was seriously behind (biosciences, lunar and planetary sciences).

In Webb’s rhetoric around science, he often discussed the idea of “basic research” in space. This terminology had gained serious traction in policy circles during the battle to create the National Science Foundation (NSF) a decade before. Despite a growing appetite for basic research in the United States, however, it remained unclear where space fit in this picture during the early 60s.

It turns out Webb had a fascinating and complex relationship with Vannevar Bush, the central figure of the NSF story and champion of basic research. They were at odds during the initial NSF battle, and had severe disagreements about space science.

But when Webb first got the administrator job at NASA, Vannevar Bush was one of the first people he reached out to for advice. Webb’s letters with Bush in these early years give us a direct look into the debate over science in space, Webb’s efforts to make space a domain for basic research, and Webb’s character as an advisor and administrator.2

Vannevar Bush as Chief of Scientific Research and Development. From Wikimedia.
James E. Webb as NASA Administrator. From NASA.

Bush v Webb in the NSF Battle

Vannevar Bush had been a key science advisor to FDR during WWII, and played an important role in applying scientific research to wartime applications. This experience convinced him that “basic research” was key to national prosperity and defense. To him, this meant scientific research that was not aimed at any practical application, but was a simple, curiosity-driven investigation of nature.

The fruits of this research were always uncertain, but that was sort of the point–the unknown was where major opportunities existed. With the support of FDR, Bush got the ball rolling on the creation of a federal agency to fund just that sort of research. But when Truman came into office, plans changed.

Bush was still in the administration at the time, and a bill establishing a Bush-style NSF was making its way through Congress in 1947. Truman ended up vetoing it, partly on the advice of one of his close advisors: James E. Webb.3

President Harry S. Truman shakes hands with Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, as Mrs. Acheson and Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, left, looks on. Mr. and Mrs. Acheson were leaving for the Big Three meeting on Western European unity in Paris. From the Truman Library.

In Truman’s administration, Bush had found himself with far less influence than he had enjoyed under FDR. Webb was director of the Bureau of the Budget at the time, and became a sort of intermediary between Bush and Truman on the subject of the NSF. They exchanged lengthy letters and held meetings on the subject, trying to bring Bush’s vision in line with Truman’s.4

Bush and Webb didn’t disagree about the need for basic scientific research. Their disagreement was fundamentally over the governance of the agency. Bush hoped for a committee of scientists that would guide the agency’s priorities, while Webb and Truman favored a single administrator. Webb argued in letters to Bush that “responsibility for the disbursement of public funds should not be actively associated with the beneficiaries of such funds,” and that the person making those decisions needed to be directly responsible to the president. Bush argued in return that an individual was much more prone to such conflicts, unless they were disconnected from science, in which case they would not be qualified to run the agency.5

Members of Congress read copies of the letters between Webb and Bush as they crafted their legislation. Eventually in 1950, the final NSF bill made it through Congress, and a compromise version of the NSF came into existence with a presidential appointment as director.

11 years later, JFK appointed Webb administrator of NASA. Not long after, Webb reached out to Vannevar Bush once again for advice. They would continue to correspond for the next several years.

Bush v Webb on Space Exploration

Bush’s attitude towards space exploration was not encouraging. He was publicly critical of the space program, and reiterated some of his issues to Webb in more detail. One of these was general distaste for the Space Race, and what it revealed about his fellow Americans. “The thing that disturbs me personally is the attitude of the American people,” Bush wrote, lamenting that the reaction to Alan Shepard’s flight “took on somewhat the form of a sporting event.”

As for space science, Bush was skeptical:

…as a nation we are putting too much emphasis on this kind of research compared with other aspects of science which are equally important or more so. We are a nation that pursues fads and which becomes overexcited at times about things that are really trivial in comparison with our truly great problems.

Vannevar Bush, Essential Writings, p 286

He also had doubts that the President was capable of receiving sound advice, given the incentive structure that was developing. Due to the “vast size of the project,” he wrote, “[n]early every man who could speak with authority on the subject has a conflict of interest.” He continued (emphasis mine):

Now do not misinterpret this to mean that the scientists of the country are all feeding at the trough, and so selfish that they would subordinate their judgement as to what is true to what is advantageous to them…The scientist or engineer in a university or a company is in a difficult quandary. He may honestly believe the program as a whole is highly fallacious. But it has been decided upon at the top level of government. It is supported by his colleagues, many of whom have enthusiasm. His organization has been urged to participate. Who is he to stand out against this powerful trend?

Bush, 289-290

He felt this doubly about the “man-in-space” program. To Bush, it was basically useless as far as science went, and was more the “result of blind mass enthusiasm rather than the result of calm deliberation and comparison.” Partly, this meant that if the Apollo program failed–and perhaps even if it succeeded–it could backfire terribly for the President. “The American public often fails for a long time to utterly grasp a situation,” he points out, “and, when it finally does, its reversal of attitude can be sobering or terrifying.”6

Bush also believed that the prestige game required more finesse than something based around spectacle. To explain this, he seems to make a reference to USAID, which had been established a couple years before the second letter was written (emphasis mine).

…national prestige is a far more subtle thing than this. The courageous and well-conceived way the President handled the threat of missiles in Cuba advanced our national prestige far more than a dozen trips to the moon. Having a large number of devoted Americans working unselfishly in undeveloped countries is far more impressive than mere technical excellence. We advance our prestige in many ways, but [the space program] was immature in its concept.

Bush, 288-289

Webb, for his part, developed a hybrid stance. He believed in the power of basic research in space,  but shared Bush’s understanding that the prestige game would require something more than a space program wholly subordinated to Apollo. In conveying this to the President, Webb would have to walk a tightrope.

Giving Advice to the President

Bush may have realized that his attitudes toward space exploration weren’t particularly useful to the administrator of NASA. So he spends time in the letters discussing a mutual experience and interest: being an advisor to a president. Apparently he had discussed this with Webb before, and had found a kindred spirit.

Bush believed that a presidential advisor had two important responsibilities. First was to provide the most accurate and sincere counsel possible, regardless of how the president may feel about the information they were provided. Second, to dutifully support and carry out whatever decision the President made with that information.7

Webb certainly seems to have applied this philosophy in his first years as administrator. While JFK firmly believed that Apollo was the only real path to “preeminence in space,” Webb believed that basic research in space was essential to achieving preeminence. This was likely based in part on the information he was receiving from the scientific community itself.

In private, he told JFK this very bluntly. In the 1962 meeting, their discussion gets noticeably tense when JFK insists on calling Apollo the “top priority” of the agency, and accelerating Apollo’s schedule at the cost of science.8 Webb is very clear that basic science should not be hamstringed for the sake of Apollo. His argument seems to combine some of Vannevar Bush’s rhetoric regarding basic research and the attitudes of scientists–like those he had just assembled in the 1962 Iowa Summer Study.

In his follow-up letter, Webb is very clear about the consequences of relegating science to a secondary priority. He was thinking long-term, planning for the world beyond a hypothetical Apollo victory (emphasis mine).

It is clear that a pre-eminence in space in the future is dependent upon an advanced research and technology program which harnesses the nation’s intellectual and inventive genius and directs it along selective paths…Research and technology must precede and pace these established goals or a stagnation of progress in space will inevitably result.

Webb, 7-8

Webb signed the letter: “With much respect, believe me…sincerely yours, James E. Webb”

The closing of Webb’s November letter to JFK. From the JFK Library.

In the end, Apollo did not get put on the heavily accelerated “crash” program. Existing scientific programs proceeded, though some were modified to support Apollo. In public addresses, Webb dutifully supported the priority of Apollo in the space race. But both during and post-Apollo, basic research would become a staple of NASA activity.

During this crucial period in NASA’s early history, however, it is clear that the question of “should we do science in space?” was very unsettled. It was actively debated in letters like these, in conferences, in the public square, and in the Oval Office.

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Footnotes

  1. In “Letter from James Webb to President Kennedy, 30 November 1962,” found at https://www.nasa.gov/history/JFK-Webbconv/pages/support-d.html Full transcript of the November 21st meeting, see : https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/static/history/jfk-webbconv/pages/transcript.pdf ↩︎
  2. Vannevar Bush, ed. G. Pascal Zachary, The Essential Writings of Vannevar Bush (Columbia University Press, 2022), pp 285-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/bush11642.53 ↩︎
  3. I wrote a long-form account of the political battle surrounding the NSF for JSTOR Daily, which you can read here, and which includes free links to papers on the topic. You can read Truman’s Memorandum of Disapproval, which largely echoes Webb’s advice, at the Truman Library. ↩︎
  4. J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation’s Formative Years, 1945-1957 (NSF, 1982), pp 61-82 https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED230414.pdf ↩︎
  5. Ibid, 71-73 ↩︎
  6. Bush, 288 ↩︎
  7. Bush, p 290 ↩︎
  8. You can listen to a recording of the meeting here: https://youtu.be/JTPcF095lJk?si=wzTj92svB9v812Ff ↩︎

The 1962 Iowa Summer Study

On By Danny RobbIn Astronomy, Geology, History, History of Exploration, History of Science, Lunar Robotics, Planetary Science, Science Policy, Space Exploration1 Comment

Author’s note: this article was originally published in The Space Review.

In June of 1962, scientists from around the United States descended on Iowa City for a summer study on science in space. Among the roster of over 200 attendees were names like Van Allen, Kuiper, Shoemaker, Spitzer, Whipple, Drake, and Sagan. They were enticed by a nice brochure, a generous honorarium, and the promise that they could shape the future of space exploration.

In one of their invitation letters, study organizer Lloyd Berkner defined the stakes. “A number of the key people in NASA will devote themselves full time to the summer study,” he wrote, “and it is clear that the outcome of the summer’s deliberations will have a far reaching influence. If we as individual scientists do not provide a major input this summer, we may miss the boat…”1

An earlier draft of that letter had ended with the question: “WHERE WERE YOU WHEN THE DECISIONS WERE MADE IN THE SUMMER OF 1962?”2

An aerial map of the State University of Iowa Campus and surrounding amenities.3

Berkner was chair of the Space Science Board (SSB), a committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). NASA administrator James E. Webb had directly requested that Berkner and the SSB organize the study with NASA funding. The two-month long event would conclude with a direct report to Webb himself.

The Iowa Summer Study, as it came to be known, convened at a critical moment. A year earlier, President John F. Kennedy had established the goal of landing a man on the Moon. Then, in November 1961, an “Office of Space Sciences” appeared on NASA’s organizational chart, with mathematician Homer Newell at the head. Science’s place in NASA, and in the Apollo program, was being actively negotiated. But the agency’s relationship to the outside scientific community was uncertain, shifting, and often tense.4 

The SSB had been created in 1958, the same year as NASA, specifically to advise government agencies. Berkner approached this role with a gusto that was not always well-received.5 Early NASA officials often saw outside scientists as presumptuous regarding their potential influence. For their part, some of the scientists on the SSB had played leading roles in the rocket programs that preceded the creation of NASA, and knew that science was one of the only practical uses for rockets beyond weaponry.6 It may have been from this position that some desired, or presumed to already possess, significant input on the space program as a whole.

And while Webb and Newell were in the process of developing in-house scientific talent, they both knew that NASA would need a good working relationship with the broader scientific community. By the end of 1961, Newell noticed that many scientists in the academic community increasingly felt like outsiders, unable to influence the direction of instruments they would be expected to use.7 Meanwhile, NASA’s launch capabilities were expanding, and the Moon was now looming on the horizon.

Webb himself was highly sympathetic to the scientists and the SSB. He was a good friend of Berkner, and had even participated in a NAS summer study on transportation.8 Summer studies like these were an established practice by this point, used by both the Department of Defense and the NAS to bring experts together on specific problems or questions.9 But the scope, purpose, and timing of the Iowa Summer Study made it somewhat unique.

To Newell, Iowa was in part an opportunity to heal an essential relationship before it worsened. To Berkner, it was a chance to preserve and deepen the influence of the SSB during NASA’s formative years. To Webb, it was a way to gather information on the best way to achieve his president’s goals in space. And for the scientists, it was an opportunity to learn more about NASA, and perhaps influence the trajectory of the nation’s space program just as it got off the ground.

The Summer of ‘62

James Van Allen was a natural fit to chair the study. He was a key member of the early rocket groups, and his experiments flew on the first US satellite, Explorer I. He was also a member of the SSB. And so his home institution, the State University of Iowa, was chosen as the venue, and preparations began early in 1962. 

On the planning team’s priority list, the evaluation of NASA’s existing scientific program was item number one. But they also intended to consider “long-range scientific goals in space science” more broadly.10 SSB planners sent multiple invitations to a long list of scientists. A brochure sold the amenities of the university and the surrounding area, hoping to get busy scientists to commit to a two month program. 

An Aerial map of the State University of Iowa Campus and surrounding amenities.11

There was major competition for their attention–for example, the Navy was conducting their own space-related study and astronomer Gerard Kuiper was moving his growing Lunar and Planetary Lab into new facilities.12 Despite the challenges, they ended up with a solid list of full-time participants, and the roster expanded further because part-time participation was quite feasible. The study was broken up into working groups, and participants could show up when the relevant working group was meeting.

Eighteen working groups covered almost every aspect of space science imaginable, including astronomy, solar system atmospheres, particles and fields, and meteorological rockets and satellites. Some working groups covered topics beyond basic scientific research, considering NASA’s relationship with universities, international cooperation, and the social and economic implications of the space program. Working groups met promptly at 9 AM and continued until the end of the work day, with a break for lunch. NASA officials often kicked off the working group sessions with explanations of existing NASA programs, and direct guidance on the sort of advice they sought.

The active and extensive involvement of NASA officials in these sessions reinforced the notion that this study might seriously influence their planning. And in public statements near the end of the study, Webb reiterated this idea. “We are financing this study to bring the best brains in our universities and industries together here, to say what’s wise for the United States to do,” he said in a press conference in Iowa, “and we expect to follow their advice wherever we can.”  When asked what made this study different from similar ones in previous years, Webb replied that it was the timing: “You don’t any longer have to argue the United States ought to have a [space] program,” he said, “now you’ve got to address yourself specifically what should the program be, in detail.”13

After Webb received briefings in August, participants compiled their work into a massive formal report titled A Review of Space Research, containing a panoramic view of scientific disciplines in the middle of 1962.14 James Van Allen, in an August address, likened the report to “an anthology of detective stories–very good ones!” But, he pointed out, these stories remained largely incomplete.15 The question remained how much impact these stories would actually have on NASA, and Apollo was one of the biggest tests.

The Future of Apollo

The working groups most relevant to Apollo were the Working Group on Lunar and Planetary Research and the Working Group on Man as a Scientist in Space Exploration. Many NASA officials attended their sessions, including Charles Sonett from NASA’s Ames Research Center and Joseph Shea from the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF). Sonett asked Lunar and Planetary participants to focus on specific recommendations, and gave direct feedback on proposals for pre-Apollo lunar sample return and budgetary issues.16 Shea had also made an earlier request for proposals of experiments to be run by the Apollo crew.17

The Subgroup on Scientific Undertakings for Man in Space (chaired by Gerard Kuiper and geologist Eugene Shoemaker, with Carl Sagan as secretary) took up broader questions of science in Apollo and beyond. A variety of NASA and DoD officials contributed, including Sonett and Verne Fryklund Jr., acting director of the Office of Space Sciences. In this group, Sonett distributed a draft report that his internal NASA committee on Apollo science had put together.18

This document would become known as the Sonett Report, and it had been specifically requested by the OMSF earlier in the year.19 Sonett’s committee, which included Shoemaker, had met during the Iowa Summer Study to produce this draft. The Iowa working group then made recommendations that influenced the final report.

In 1963, Fryklund sent a memo to director Robert Gilruth at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC, also present in Iowa) with guidelines on the scientific objectives for the Apollo program. In it, he outlined the Sonett report and the incorporation of the Iowa Summer Study recommendations.20 In the end this meant prioritizing generalized observation, sample collection, and deployment of monitoring equipment like seismometers. 

These recommendations seem to have influenced Apollo scientific planning in a fairly general sense. Apollo scientific planners Noel Hinners and Donald Beattie, neither of whom actually attended, both saw the discussions in Iowa as foundational for their work.21 But while these early reports may have broadly influenced mission architecture, many of their specific recommendations would not make it to actual Apollo missions.22 And one of their strongest recommendations would end up being firmly denied.

The SSB had sent out a questionnaire earlier in the year, which W.W. Kellogg summarized in Review.23 “Should a scientist (at least one) be a member of the first Apollo crew?” one question read. Kellogg’s summary of the responses included what may be the only exclamation point in the entire document: “Emphatically, ‘Yes!’”24

This was also the conclusion of both the Iowa working groups and the Sonett Report. But Shoemaker’s memory of Iowa was not a pleasant one, because he got the sense that this advice was already falling on deaf ears. In a 1988 interview, historian Ron Doel asked Shoemaker about Iowa.

“It was perfectly plain that [the MSC representatives] didn’t want scientists sticking their damn noses in any way into the whole venture,” Shoemaker recalled. “They regarded us as a huge nuisance. It was offensive.”25 In the end, a scientist would not fly on an Apollo mission until Apollo 17.

But tensions surrounding Apollo went even deeper. Some in the scientific community had already been vocal about their opposition to the Apollo program altogether. In Iowa, this conflict became more direct as NASA officials and scientists were thrown into the same rooms. Iowa Journalism professor William Porter was tasked with making observations, and in a reflection written near the end of the Study, mentions what he called “steamy sessions” that addressed the question of overall national goals.26

The summary in Review characterized these discussions as revealing “considerable confusion about the Apollo mission and its proper justifications.”27 This impression likely came both from those opposed to Apollo, and those who saw Apollo as a primarily scientific mission. NASA officials emphasized to the scientists that Apollo was primarily an engineering effort, and that science (while important) was firmly secondary.

Some scientists, for their part, “sensed what they felt was a confusion between public relations and science,” Porter wrote.28 Some scientists in Iowa expressed fear that a veneer of science was being used to legitimize the Apollo program, a scenario made worse by their perception that Apollo was drawing funds away from productive scientific projects.29

These concerns made it all the way to the Oval Office a few months later, when JFK asked Webb about the possibility of doing exactly that to expedite a lunar landing. Webb made a vigorous defense of science, with arguments echoing those presented to him in Iowa.

Webb told the President that “if I go out and say that [Apollo] is the number-one priority and that everything else must give way to it, I’m going to lose an important element of support for your program and for your administration…particularly the brainy people in the industry and in the universities who are looking at a solid base.”30 In the end, they did not move forward with concepts of a “crash” program.31

Webb was trying to both support his president’s goals and maintain a solid relationship with the scientific community–a delicate balancing act. Early in 1963, he used direct quotes from Review to justify Apollo in scientific terms during a speech in Chicago.32 Regardless of his intentions, this may have been exactly the sort of legitimization tactic that some who contributed to the report had feared.

Both Berkner and Newell also tried to smooth things over with scientists in Iowa and beyond. They emphasized that Apollo was happening regardless, so the scientists should get on board. Many accepted this to varying degrees, but tensions around Apollo would never fully disappear.

Impact and Continuing Studies

In his final address, Berkner highlighted several topics where he felt the Study had made significant contributions. In addition to lunar science and Apollo, Berkner pointed to discussions concerning the search for extraterrestrial life, investigation of the origins of life, and the sterilization of spacecraft.33

Another topic that emerged was the potential of large space telescopes. Astronomer Leo Goldberg was chair of the astronomy working group. In 1978, Goldberg told Spencer Weart that it was the SSB that connected him directly to NASA. “The big thing I remember about Iowa,” he said, “is that we learned for the first time that it was going to be possible to rendezvous and dock in space. And right away we all began to think: gee, this is how you build a big telescope in space, or a big laboratory.”34 This was exactly the sort of thing many organizers hoped would come out of these meetings.

The overall impression from both the report and observers was that in spite of any disagreements, the scientists in Iowa generally endorsed NASA’s existing programs, recognized that NASA had hired some competent people, and provided a set of detailed and actionable recommendations at a crucial juncture in the organization’s history.35

Throughout, Porter reflected, most scientists had taken their task very seriously. They had strayed, sometimes, beyond their purview, often to the annoyance of the administrators. But Porter had the impression that the scientists were very aware of how limited their influence might ultimately be, and persisted regardless.

Porter speculated about why the scientists would have approached the proceedings in this way: “…many individual scientists feel responsibile(sic), in a curious kind of way, for NASA; they feel that the society at large may hold them responsible as a group for the operations of science in space, as they feel that the society at large holds science responsible for the atomic bomb and the things that followed it.”36

The relationship between the SSB and NASA deepened in the years following Iowa. The SSB appeared by name on NASA organizational charts starting in August 1962, with a dotted line connecting it directly to the Administrator. The NAS would remain on these organizational charts until 1977.37

Van Allen would refer to A Review of Space Research as “a classical document and became the prototype for subsequent studies by the SSB.”38 The next study after Iowa took place at Woods Hole, Massachusetts in 1965. There, scientists continued some conversations left off in Iowa, including discussions of the “Large Orbital Telescope.” Goldberg was present once again, and remembered the hopeful atmosphere of the Woods Hole meeting. “At the time, the future just seemed unlimited,” he said.39

NASA historian Joseph Alexander explains that after Iowa, “summer studies remained a staple of the SSB’s activities through the 1970s.”40 The 1980s saw summer studies that rivaled the Iowa study in scale, he writes, before their frequency eventually declined under budgetary pressure.

Special thanks to Hemlock Stanier, Graduate Student Lead at The University of Iowa Special Collections & Archives, who found and scanned items of interest in the James Van Allen Papers. Their work in helping me navigate and access the collection was invaluable. Thanks also to Dwayne Day for assistance and suggestions in the early stages of this project.

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Footnotes

  1. Lloyd Berkner, letter to Abelson, March 2, 1962, Box 284, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  2. RC Peavey, telegram to J A Van Allen, March 1, 1962, Box 284, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  3. Space Science Summer Study brochure, Box 285, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  4. See Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science (NASA, 1980) https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19810012433  ↩︎
  5. Newell, p 212  ↩︎
  6. The Rocket Panel went by many names over the years, and had overlapping membership with various scientific advisory groups. This embryonic program also included the IGY committee. See Newell’s account of the Rocket Panel and IGY program in Beyond, pp 25–58. See also Joseph K. Alexander, Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership (NASA, 2017) pp 5–11. ↩︎
  7. Newell, pp 206–207 ↩︎
  8. Oral history transcript, James E. Webb, interview 1, April 29, 1969, by T.H. Baker, LBJ Presidential Library, pp 3–5 https://discoverlbj.org/item/oh-webbj-19690429-1-74-266 ↩︎
  9. For example, the USAF and the Navy had been using summer studies in the early 1950s. See Dwayne Day, Lighting Rod: A History of the Air Force Chief Scientist’s Office (USAF, 2000), p 39 ↩︎
  10. “Suggested Topics for Consideration,” January 31, 1962, Box 284, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  11. Space Science Summer Study brochure, Box 285, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  12. Kuiper to Berkner; Peavey to Kellogg, Box 284, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  13. “Space Science Press Conference,” 1962–08–23, University of Maryland, American Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and Washington, DC, accessed April 28, 2026, http://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip-500-qf8jjp77. ↩︎
  14. A Review of Space Research, National Academy of Sciences — National Research Council, (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 1962) https://doi.org/10.17226/12421 ↩︎
  15. James A. Van Allen, “Resume of Summer Study Program”, August 8, 1962, p 3, Box 287, 1962 James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  16. “Minutes of the Lunar and Planetary Research Working Group”, Jun 25, (p 1), June 29, (p 4–5), Box 289, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  17. Ibid, July 2, p. 2 ↩︎
  18. “Minutes of Meeting of Working Group on Man as a Scientist in Space Exploration,” Box 288, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  19. “Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Apollo Experiments and Training on the Scientific Aspects of the Apollo Program,” December 15, 1963. https://www.lpi.usra.edu/lunar/documents/SonettReport.pdf  ↩︎
  20. Fryklund to Gilruth, “Scientific Guidelines for the Apollo Project,” October 8, 1963, in Exploring the Unknown, Volume VII (NASA), 2008), SP-2008–4407, p 617 ↩︎
  21. Donald Beattie, Taking Science to the Moon: Lunar Experiments and the Apollo Program, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p xiv, https://archive.org/details/takingsciencetom0000beat; Hinners to Wright, August 18, 2010, (p 11–12), https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/hinnersnw-8-18-10.pdf?emrc=c494ad ↩︎
  22. See David Portree, “Apollo Science and Sites: The Sonett Report (1963)”, https://spaceflighthistory.blogspot.com/2019/11/apollo-science-and-sites-sonett-report.html  ↩︎
  23. Some of the most extensive responses came from Carl Sagan, Thomas Gold, and Harold Urey; Kellogg to Nelson, “Review of Answers to Space Science Board Questions on “Scientific Program for the Apollo Mission”, July 23, 1962, Box 288, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  24. Review, Chapter 11, pp 17–19  ↩︎
  25. Eugene Shoemaker, interview by Ron Doel, session IV, September 8, 1988, transcript, Niels Bohr Library and Archives, American Institute of Physics, pp 6–7 https://repository.aip.org/node/128785; It’s somewhat unclear if Shoemaker is remembering the Iowa Summer Study specifically, or the Sonett group meetings that had convened in Iowa earlier that year. He may be conflating them, and exaggerating their attitudes, but NASA officials certainly tried to temper the expectations of scientists in the study meetings, and comments in the working group meeting minutes could be fairly interpreted as saying that scientists would likely NOT be included on early Apollo missions. ↩︎
  26. William Porter, “The Context of the Space Science Summer Study”, p 3, Box 287, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries. ↩︎
  27. Review, Chapter 1, pp 21–22 ↩︎
  28. Ibid, p 3 ↩︎
  29. Newell, 208 ↩︎
  30. “Transcript of Presidential Meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House,” November 21, 1962, Prepared by Dwayne Day from John F. Kennedy Library Presdient’s Office files, NASA, p 15–18 https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/static/history/jfk-webbconv/pages/transcript.pdf 
    ↩︎
  31. For additional context and analysis, see Dwayne Day, https://www.nasa.gov/history/JFK-Webbconv/pages/backgnd.html  ↩︎
  32. James Webb, “Keynote Address — National Goals in the Space Age,” in Proceedings of the Conference on Space-Age Planning (NASA, 1963), p. 5–7; Webb acknowledged some of the scientific dissent and the recommendation for a scientist on the first Apollo crews, but largely emphasized scientific opportunities created by Apollo.  ↩︎
  33. Lloyd Berkner, “Closing Remarks,” August 9, 1962, Box 287, James A. Van Allen Papers (RG99.0142), Special Collections & Archives, University of Iowa Libraries.  ↩︎
  34. Goldberg to Weart, transcript, May 17, 1982 Niels Bohr Library and Archives, American Institute of Physics, p 81 https://repository.aip.org/node/127942  ↩︎
  35. See Review, Porter, and Newell  ↩︎
  36. Porter, p 2  ↩︎
  37. See https://www.nasa.gov/history/historical-organizational-charts/  ↩︎
  38. See: https://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu//full/1990AREPS..18….1V/0000019.000.html ↩︎
  39. Goldberg, p 84  ↩︎
  40. Alexander, 25 ↩︎